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In this article, we study the global acquisition trends of Chinese companies. We look at the countries 
and sectors they are investing in and the factors driving those investments. We consider the inflexion 
points and the changes before and after the Global Financial Crisis. The focus of the paper is the 
evolution of mergers and acquisitions (M&A), but we also consider greenfield investments and overall 
outward foreign direct investments. To that end, we use longitudinal data from three sources: the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ, and 
Financial Times fDi Markets. We note that M&A activity was key for the rapid growth and the fast 
internationalization pace of Chinese companies. While M&A is the entry mode of choice for Chinese 
firms to approach the developed world (Europe and the U.S.), greenfields are more common for 
expansion in Asia and Africa. The paper also provides comparisons with data from other emerging 
markets and the U.S. 
Keywords: Chinese multinationals; Emerging markets; Mergers and Acquisitions; Internationalization; 
Global expansion; Outward Foreign Direct Investment; Entry mode; Greenfield   
 
Corresponding author: e-mail: Lourdes.casanova@cornell.edu 
Received 20 January 2019 - Accepted 08 May 2019       
 
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Non-Commercial-No 
Derivatives License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/), which permits non-comercial re-use and 





Volume 4, Number 2, 13-44, July-December 2019           doi.org/10.1344/JESB2019.2.j059  
 
Online ISSN: 2385-7137                                                                                                      COPE Committee on Publication Ethics 
http://revistes.ub.edu/index.php/JESB  Creative Commons License 4.0      
14 
1. Introduction 
China is often depicted as an economic miracle. Less attention has been paid to the growth of 
Chinese companies which has been parallel to the growth of its economy. One indicator of this 
power is the presence in the rankings of the Fortune 500 Global (Casanova and Miroux 2018) 
where the number of Chinese firms grew considerably after the Global Financial crisis. In 2008, 
there were only 20 Chinese firms, while in 2018 there were 10 times more at 111. As Chinese 
companies grew, they also became major cross-border investors. This article examines both 
modes of entry in foreign markets: greenfield and M&A deals for Chinese firms, their evolution 
over time based on available data from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ2. 
2. China’s role in global investment flows 
Since 2000, China has been the second destination for global foreign direct investment (FDI), 
receiving $136 billion of FDI flows in 2017, as compared to $275 billion for the U.S. China is 
an outlier compared to other emerging markets, in particular with what we call the E20 
(Casanova and Miroux 2016), the 20 largest emerging markets by nominal gross domestic 
product (GDP)3. 
China’s outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) has been unduly overlooked: according to 
MOFCOM (2017) China is among the 10 biggest world investors since the 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) and amongst the top three countries in yearly flows since 2012. In 
addition, China ranked second in OFDI stock (accumulated investments over the years) in 2016 
and 2017. In 2017, China invested $158 billion and was the third biggest investor in the world 
after the U.S. ($342 billion) and very close to the second economy, that of Japan ($160 billion). 
By 2017, China’s OFDI represented 11.1% of the world total flows and 5.9% of the world’s 
OFDI stock.  
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According to MOFCOM 2017, the main destination of China’s investments is its ”natural 
market”, Asia (63% of its OFDI stocks lie there). The other destinations are in decreasing order: 
Latin America (21%), Europe (6.1%), North America (almost 5%) and Africa and Oceania 
(2.5%). China focuses primarily in “South-South” investments, which account for almost 86% 
of the total Chinese OFDI as compared to 12.7% to the developed world. Regarding the 
developed world, and from the above figures, it is evident that China invests more in the 
European Union than in the U.S. China’s OFDI stock (as the flow) is also higher in the European 
Union than in the U.S. (Hanemann and Rosen 2012; Nicolas 2014). M&A data show a similar 
pattern. 
The same source shows that China’s investments are diversified into six main industries that 
represent 86% of the total OFDI stock: Leasing and Business Services (34% of OFDI stock), 
Wholesale and Retail Trade (12.5%), IT and technical services (13%), Financial Services 
(11%), Mining (8.7%), and Manufacturing (7%).  
If we compare both FDI and OFDI, China was a net exporter of capital in 2015, 2016 and 2017. 
In 2017, the country invested $50 billion more abroad than what it received in FDI. This 
investment spree is due mainly to the actions of 39,000 Chinese companies in 189 countries, 
with total assets of $6 trillion and an accumulated OFDI (stock) of $1.8 trillion according to 
MOFCOM 2017.  
Regarding ownership of companies, it is often claimed by experts that state-owned companies 
(Morck et al. 2008; Luo et al. 2010; Ramasamy et al. 2012) represent the bulk of overseas 
investments but their participation in OFDI continue to decrease. In 2017, they represented 
about 50% of total investments abroad, a 5% decrease with respect to 2016. 
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Greenfield investments and M&A transactions have been the main catalysts for growth for 
Chinese firms. M&A are a significant tool for acquiring knowledge, technical expertise, natural 
resources, customer base and talent—all of which can be difficult and time-consuming to 
develop internally (Buckley et al. 2007; Chen 2008; Deng 2009; Luo and Tung 2007; Wang et 
al. 2012). 
Hence, M&A is key for Chinese firms to catch-up with western global multinationals. With the 
help of government initiatives, and regulatory revisions more Chinese companies have been 
investing in new industries in a growing number of countries. Policies such as the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI, also known as the One Belt One Road, OBOR) launched in 2013, and 
fewer restrictions for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to invest overseas have significantly aided 
growth (Luo et al. 2010). Let’s look at Greenfield data first to compare it with M&A in the next 
sections. 
3. Chinese greenfield investment 
In greenfield FDI, a company initiates an investment from scratch; this may include building a 
manufacturing plant, a new distribution hub, offices or living quarters. In this definition of the 
term, we include brownfield projects, i.e., those that modify or upgrade existing investments. 
Since 2008, China has increased announced greenfield FDI projects all over the world.4 In the 
subsequent decade, the value of such projects has doubled in Asia (to $245 billion), more than 
tripled in Africa (to $60 billion) and Europe (to $70 billion), and experienced an eight and 
tenfold increase respectively in the U.S. (to $44 billion) and Latin America (to $80 billion). 
While China’s overall investments are primarily in their natural markets—in this case, in Asian 
neighboring markets with geographical or cultural proximity—its greenfield projects 
increasingly target countries in developed markets and Latin America. North America’s share 
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of Chinese OFDI greenfield projects quadrupled in the post-2008 crisis period; that of Latin 
America’s investment increased by 66% (Figure 1). Comparing China’s outward greenfield 
projects pre- and post-2008, Figure 1 shows that Metals and Coal and Oil & Natural Gas 
industries have become less important in China’s portfolio compared to other/new industries. 
Both sectors saw their shares halved from their pre-crisis period levels. The sectors that have 
most benefited from China’s greenfield OFDI are less traditional sectors. The sectors include 
Real Estate as confirmed by OFDI data above, and notably, Business Services and Renewable 
Energy. The latter two registered a nine and twofold increase respectively in their portfolio 
shares.  
Figure 1. China’s outward greenfield FDI pre- and post-2008 GFC. Periods compared are 




















Source: Authors based on data from fDi Markets accessed by September 2017. 
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4. Chinese M&A activity  
In the term “M&As”, we include mergers, one company acquiring another, assets purchases or 
management acquisitions. The goal of a M&A is to grow fast to gain one or more of the 
following benefits: economies of scale, market access, a new brand, technology and know-how.  
While in 2000, China barely registered any M&A activity (Figure 2), in 2015, the value of its 
announced outbound M&As ($138 billion) placed it in the fifth  position overall, between 
Singapore ($121 billion) and the Netherlands ($171 billion)- but still far behind the #1 ranked 
U.S., $488 billion. According to MOFCOM 2017, firms from China participated in 431 M&A 
transactions in 56 countries.  
Not only has China become a major global acquirer, it has also been increasingly involved in 
very large transactions. Appendix 1 lists the top 100 outbound M&A transactions globally 
between July 1, 2015 and June 30, 2016. This list excludes announced transactions made by a 
consortium of investors from multiple countries. Seventeen of the top 100 global transactions 
originated from China, the largest number of deals by a single country. The $43 billion 
announced acquisition of Syngenta by China National Chemical Corporation (“ChemChina”) 
in February 2016 was the fourth biggest overseas deal by any company in the world between 
July 1, 2015 and June 30, 2016. After China, the countries most active in the largest transactions 
during this period were the U.S. (with 15 of top 100 announced deals), Canada (12 announced 
deals), Germany (seven announced deals), followed by the U.K. and France (six announced 
deals each). In the next sections, we will present data regarding the growth of M&A volumes, 
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4.1 Rapid rise in M&A volumes pre- and post- global financial crisis 
M&A is a significant mode of entry to quickly expand internationally. In 2016, China emerged 
as the second biggest global acquirer after the U.S., (Figure 3), at which time Chinese M&A 
deals represented 18% of the M&As of the top 10 investor countries. This is a remarkable 
development if one considers that China was hardly visible as a global acquirer in the early 
2000s (Xu et al. 2012). The sudden and remarkable increase that took place in Chinese M&As 
in 2016 in particular - when the value of announced M&A deals reached an estimated $224 
billion - contributed to Chinese authorities’ reaction to curtail capital outflows (more on this in 
Section 5.1), targeting M&As in particular. Despite the decline in M&A activity that ensued, 
China was still a leading global acquirer by mid-2017, accounting for 9% of M&A deals and 
ranking third (following the U.S. and the U.K.) in terms of M&A activity for the first semester 
of 2017.  
Figure 2. Chinese M&A activity: Announced outbound M&A deals (2003-Q2 2017) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data on announced M&A transactions from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ 
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The GFC was the trigger for China’s M&A activity which increased 380% post-GFC relative 
to pre-crisis levels (Table 1 and Figure 4), much more than for other emerging countries. China 
has a similar impressive growth in Greenfield activity (181%) post 2009. Among emerging 
markets, Korea saw similar increases as China in M&A activity, India also grew in both 
variables while Brazil decreased by 3% in M&A. This compares to a more modest increase for 
the leader, U.S. (47%), which retains by far its number one position in the world. 
Table 1. Changes in China compared to most active emerging markets Brazil, India, Korea and 
the U.S. of announced outbound M&A deals and greenfield investments: comparing 





Outbound  M&A 
(total amount in millions) 
Growth: +  380% 
Rank pre- crisis: 




Pre-crisis period: $26,324 
Post-crisis period: $111,165 
th: + 22
INDIA Pre-crisis period: $63,250 
Post-crisis period: $79,165 
Growth: +25% 
BRAZIL Pre-crisis period: $60,767 
Post-crisis period: $28,866 
Growth: -3% 
CHINA Pre-crisis: $166,325 
Post-crisis: $798,013 
Growth: +380% 
U.S. Pre-crisis period: $1,518,855 
Post-crisis period: $2,186,658 
Growth: +44% 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data on M&A transactions originating from China and Hong Kong ($ value in 
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Figure 3.  Top 15 economies, other selected E20 by announced outbound M&A deals (in                            
millions) in 2016 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data on announced M&A transactions from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ 
accessed in January 2017. Excludes financial centers in the Caribbean.  
 
As shown in Casanova and Miroux 2018, together U.S., Canada, the U.K., the Netherlands, 
China, Singapore, Ireland, France, Japan and Switzerland accounted for $1.6 trillion of cross-
border M&As in 2015. The total value of deals that originated in China as a percentage of the 
total value of deals that originated from the top 10 global acquirer increased from less than 1% 
in 2000 to 10% in 2017. The U.S. accounted for 30% of the total value of outbound M&A by 
these top 10 countries, followed by the U.K. at 14%, Canada at 12%, Netherlands at 11% and 
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4.2 Europe leads the U.S. in geographical destination for Chinese M&As 
Following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, Chinese M&As have increasingly targeted 
developed countries, unlike the destination of its overall OFDI which targets emerging markets. 
In 2012, a peak year for such transactions, developed countries accounted for an estimated 80% 
value of acquisitions and for more than 60% during the 2015-2017 period. Among developed 
countries, Europe was the most important destination, accounting for about 37% of the value 
of all transactions from 2015-2017 (Figures 5, 6a and 6b). In some ways, China’s outbound 
M&As mirrored the geographical breakdown of the U.S. outbound acquisitions: indeed, Europe 
accounted for about 78% of all U.S. outbound M&As over the same period (Figures 7). 
Surprisingly, Asia - the main recipient of OFDI (63% of the OFDI stock lies there) - does not 
occupy a prominent place in the M&A activity of Chinese firms. 
China’s M&A activity in Europe and Latin America has increased steadily over the years 
(Buckley et al. 2007; Nicolas 2014). Although from a much lower level, we see a similar pattern 
in other emerging countries (Figure 5) where the acquisitions target the U.S. pre GFC and move 
more to Europe after that. If we consider China, Europe accounted for about 33% of the total 
value of M&A deals between 2009 and mid-2016, compared to about 19% between 2000 and 
2008, i.e. in the pre-crisis period (Figure 6b). The share of Latin America in the total value of 
outbound M&A deals from China increased from about 8% (in the pre-crisis period) to 15% 
(post-crisis) – see Figure 6a. This shift towards Europe, U.S. and Latin America has primarily 
been driven by cheap currencies (relatively low euro rates and currency devaluations in Latin 
America), opportunities due to the financial hardships of many companies after the global 
financial crisis (both in Europe and the U.S.), the desire of Chinese firms to seek advanced 
technologies (mainly in Europe) and new markets for their products/services (Buckley et al. 
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2007); Nicolas 2014). Africa and the Middle East remain much less important target regions 
for Chinese M&As. It is important to note that there have also been M&As in Europe by 
financial investors from China, which are not accounted for in figure 4. For example, in one of 
the biggest acquisitions in 2016, a consortium of Chinese financial investors consisting of 
Beijing Jianguang Asset Management Co., Ltd (“JAC Capital”) and Wise Road Capital LTD 
(“Wise Road Capital”) announced the purchase of Standard Products business from 
Netherlands-based semiconductor company, NXP Semiconductors N.V. for $2.75 billion. 
Prominent recent M&As in Europe besides the above-mentioned Syngenta deal were the 
purchase of Swiss air-travel logistics company Gate Group Holding AG for $1.5 billion by 
China based HNA Group Co., Ltd. in April 2016 and the sale by South African/British Anglo 
American plc (“Anglo American”) of its Niobium and Phosphates businesses in Brazil to China 
Molybdenum Co. Ltd (“CMOC”) for a reported total cash of $1.5 billion in April 2016.  
Figure 4. Total value of announced M&A deals by E20 firms 2003-2016, pre-GFC (2003-
2008) and post-GFCs (2009-2016) (U.S. millions) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data on announced M&A transactions from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ 
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Figure 5. Geographical distribution of announced M&A deals from China versus other E20 
countries pre- (2003-2009) and post-GFC (2009-2016). Top figure pre-GFC (2003-
2008) and bottom figure post-crisis (2009-2016) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data on announced M&A transactions from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ 
accessed on January 2017. 
Figure 6a. Destination of Chinese announced outbound M&A value by region 2003-Q2 2017 
($ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data on announced M&A transactions originating from China and Hong Kong 
($ value in millions) from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ. 2017 data deals announced through June 30, 2017. 
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Figure 6b. Destination of Chinese announced outbound M&A value by region pre- (2003-
2009) and post-GFC (2009-2016 in $ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data from Standard &Poors’ Capital IQ accessed by September 2017 
Figure 7. U.S. announced cross-border M&A value by region 2014-2017 ($ millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis, based on data from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ accessed July 2018. Note: data as in 
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4.3 China’s increased focus on services 
The industry distribution5 of Chinese outbound M&A has also changed in recent years. Prior to 
the global financial crisis, the majority of Chinese investments abroad were focused on the 
Energy and Materials6 sectors:  together they accounted for 52% of total transaction value of 
all announced Chinese M&A between 2000 and 2008. In comparison, Industrials7 (6%), 
Financials (10%) and Consumers (15%) sectors transactions were smaller in value. After 2009 
the M&A deals made through the second quarter of 2016 have had a more uniform distribution 
across industries. Energy (17%) and Materials (18%) accounted for 35% of the total value of 
deals between 2009 and 2016, while other sectors such as Industrials (14%), Financials (17%) 
and Consumer (19%) have all increased as a percentage of total deals (Figure 8). Furthermore, 
according to Capital IQ data in 2015, over 80% of the Chinese outbound deals were in 
Consumer, Industrials, Financials and Information Technology sectors. 
Energy, Industrials, Materials and IT accounted for about half of the acquisition value from 
2014-2017 (Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ data for M&A). This sectoral focus not only closely 
tracks U.S. outbound acquisitions (for which IT and Materials are important sectors – see Figure 
9), but also foreshadowed the sectors that the Made in China 2025 strategy would focus on. 
Due to such widespread acquisitions by China in these sectors, some countries feared that their 
native technology sectors would fall under foreign control, leading to distrust from several 
developed nations towards Chinese M&As (further details provided in section 5.2). At the same 
time, Real Estate was the largest target sector for China in 2017, and would soon face new 
restrictions from the Chinese government (more on this subject in section 5.1), which was wary 
that transactions in this sector were driven by speculative motivations. 
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Figure 8. Sector distribution of Chinese announced M&A deals (2014-2017) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis, based on data from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ accessed July 2018. 
Figure 9. Sectoral distribution of U.S. announced M&As deals (2014-2017) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis, based on data from Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ accessed July 2018. 
4.4 Increasing size of M&A deals from China 
In the post GFC phase, along with the increase in the overall value of M&A deals as we saw in 
3.1, the average deal size also increased from $211 million in 2000-2008 to $275 million in 
2009-2016 (Figure 10). In addition, as the value of deals has increased, they have also become 
more expensive, and Chinese companies have been willing to pay a higher price for the targeted 
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Price/Earnings ratios (average premium). TEV and Price (in case of public companies) are 
measures of the total value of the firm. Put simply, the higher these ratios, the higher an acquirer 
is willing to pay for the target. We analyzed the TEV/Revenue ratios for Chinese overseas 
transactions for the periods mentioned above. The Average TEV/Revenue ratio increased from 
5.7 in 2000-2008 to 9.9 in 2009- June 2016 (Figure 10). As well, for the publicly traded M&A 
targets, average acquisition premium (based on prior week price of the publicly traded target 
company) increased from 27.6 percent to 36.4 percent. 
Figure 10. Price and valuation of Chinese outbound M&A deals (2000 – Q2’16) (in millions) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ data on M&A Transactions accessed on 
January 2017. 
We also compared the Chinese outbound M&A deals with the U.S. ones (Figure 11). While the 
M&A deals China has done in the past years have been bigger than in the past, they are still 
small on average compared to the U.S. outbound deals. For instance, the average deal size for 
the U.S. in 2015 was $592m compared to $269m for outbound Chinese deals. Average 
acquisition premiums paid by both Chinese and U.S. companies were more comparable, with a 
premium between 25 to 30 percent in 2015 (29.8% for Chinese and 26.2% for American firms). 
The higher average TEV to Revenue ratio for Chinese deals could reflect the mix of deals. 
Indeed, smaller deals tend to have higher revenue ratios and China had a higher percentage 
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(70%) of smaller deals (less than $100 million) than the United States (63%). Furthermore, 
higher Chinese premiums could be due to the fact that Chinese companies are likely to be less 
known compared to U.S. companies and therefore may be facing some resistance from sellers 
demanding higher premiums as it happens sometimes with other Emerging Markets 
Multinationals. Besides, given the increased scrutiny and regulatory hurdles to which Chinese 
acquisitions are submitted at home and in host developed countries (more on this subject in 
sections 5.1 and 5.2), completing a transaction with a Chinese buyer tends to be perceived as 
increasingly more complex, subjected to more regulatory scrutiny, and riskier – leading to 
demands of higher prices on the part of sellers. 
Figure 11. Price and valuation of China and U.S. outbound M&A deals (2015) 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on Standard & Poor’s Capital IQ data on M&A transactions accessed on 
January 2017. 
 
5. Adjusting to a new paradigm 
Since 2016, when China’s M&A activity rose to the forefront, surpassing some Western 
companies and countries for the first time, U.S. foreign policy under President Trump 
administration shifted to a more rigorous scrutiny of FDI into the country and more specifically 
Chinese investments in the U.S. Chinese acquisitions started facing restrictions not only in the 
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U.S. but also increasingly in the western world. This was accompanied by pressures at home to 
reduce acquisitions and FDI forays in foreign markets. These issues are described in more detail 
in the following sections.  
5.1 Policy changes at home  
Since the 1990s, Chinese government policies have been instrumental in the country’s 
emergence as a powerhouse global investor. The policies progressively evolved from 
restriction, to liberalization and then to outright support and encouragement, as we analyzed in 
Casanova and Miroux 2016, 2017 and 2018. The “Go Global” strategy, launched in 2000, 
marked the beginning of a phase of significant proactive support aimed at encouraging Chinese 
firms’ expansion abroad. In subsequent years, the strategy gained strength as part of China’s 
Five-Year Plans. Today, the Ministry of Commerce, the National Development and Reform 
Commission, the Export-Import Bank of China, the China Development Bank and China 
Export and Credit Insurance Corporation all provided a network of administrative, financial 
and commercial support. The country has also engaged in active investment diplomacy, marked 
by the Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting both Latin America and Africa three times since 
he took office (Latin America in 2013, 2014 and 2016 and Africa in 2014, 2016 and 2018). 
Finally, other government-led initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative – BRI, also known 
as One Belt and One Road” (OBOR)”9 – launch in 2013 has and will likely fuel further China’s 
OFDI expansion. According to MOFCOM 2017, Chinese Investments in the BRI countries has 
increased from 12.63 billion in 2013 to 20.17 in 2017, an overall increase of 59.6% and 
represents right now 12.7% of China’s OFDI flows. 
A dramatic surge of outbound M&As in 2015-2016 prompted the Chinese government, eager 
to maintain financial stability, to quickly shift course in order to tame the massive capital 
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outflows that took place during those years. Authorities also feared that speculative rather than 
economic reasons motivated a number of those transactions and worried about the stability of 
the renminbi. Of special concern were cases of acquisitions outside the buyer’s core area of 
business—in real estate and entertainment, for instance, two industries that had seen a flurry of 
large deals. Hence, in the fall of 2016 the government announced stricter approval requirements 
for M&A deals10 and restricted real estate purchases abroad by State-Owned Enterprises 
(SOEs). Later on, in August 2017, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) 
issued “guidelines on overseas investment” that classify overseas investments into three main 
categories: 1) encouraged investments; 2) restricted investments; and 3) prohibited 
investments. The guidelines for instance restrict investment in real estate, hotels, entertainment, 
and sport clubs and prohibits them in inter alia, gambling and ’lewd industries’ as well as those 
that provide access to sensitive sectors such as core military. On the other hand, encouraged 
investments include those that promote the Belt and Road Initiative (in particular in 
infrastructure and connectivity projects, see increase noted earlier in Chinese OFDI in those 
countries), or that strengthen cooperation with overseas high-tech and advanced manufacturing 
companies. 
Subsequently, in December 2017, the National Development and Reform Commission, along 
with four other agencies, released a code of conduct for private companies investing abroad. 
Several highly leveraged and risky outbound acquisitions appeared to motivate this code, 
particularly targeting Chinese firms with a history of mega deals, such as the conglomerate 
Wanda owner of a private developer and various cinema chains, the conglomerate and 
investment company Fosun, which bought among others France’s Club Med, and British 
Thomas Cook and Canada’s Cirque du Soleil besides the U.S. insurer Meadowbrook in 2014 
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and in 2016 the English football club Wolverhampton Wanderers. Another targeted company 
was the tourism conglomerate (HNA) which owned among other assets almost 10% of 
Deutsche Bank and 30% of NH Hotel Group and the insurance Anbang which boght the 
emblematic hotel Waldorf Astoria in New York city among other hotels. The Code calls upon 
Chinese firms to avoid high leverage financing and stay within their core area of activities, as 
well as respect local laws, including social and environmental standards. The new guidelines 
also require firms to report investment plans to the government and to seek approval for 
investments in “sensitive” countries or industries.11 While some observers note that the code of 
conduct does not consist of hard and fast rules,12 the warning to Chinese foreign investors has 
been clear. As of December 2018, a code of conduct for SOEs was said to also be in the works. 
These policy shifts have not only tempered the acquisition fervor of Chinese investors, but also 
affected the confidence of their financiers. Thereafter, financing became harder to obtain, 
revealing in some cases that firms had overextended themselves. One such example is HNA, 
which was forced to rid itself of high-prized recent acquisitions. The Chinese airline 
conglomerate was one of the most prominent Chinese acquirers from 2015-2016, and was 
obligated to sell off assets in 2017-2018, including major real estate properties in the U.S., Hong 
Kong, and Australia, and some of its equity stakes in Deutsche Bank and other firms.  
This OFDI policy shift is partly responsible for the above-mentioned drop in Chinese outbound 
M&As in 2017 and early 2018.13 In the medium term, however, the net effect of the new 
measures is uncertain. While speculative deals will likely face higher hurdles, the underlying 
economic motivations for increased outbound Chinese M&As remain the same. For companies, 
these motivations include easier access to resources, and in acquisitions in developed countries, 
access to markets, international brands, technology and expertise, as well as better return on 
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assets. On the government’s side, the overall objective is still that of an economy with high 
value-added sectors and a strong focus on innovation, as illustrated by the Made in China 2025 
Plan. For instance, transactions that are “economically” sound or fall in line with the 
government policy of “strengthening cooperation” in high tech and manufacturing will likely 
benefit from the above mentioned guidelines on overseas investment.  
5.2 Increased scrutiny in host countries 
Serious obstacles also lie on the receiving end of Chinese outward investment as a number of 
developed countries, wary of Chinese investment, have introduced restrictions of their own on 
acquisitions by foreign investors. 
Many countries have instituted mechanisms for screening foreign investments. While such 
mechanisms have often been motivated by national security concerns, they increasingly reflect 
other considerations such as the protection of strategic industries, critical infrastructure and key 
technologies.14 In recent months in particular, developed countries have strengthened their 
screening mechanisms, partly as a reaction to the wave of Chinese investments in high tech and 
advanced manufacturing industries and in strategic sectors. For instance:  
 In Germany, the Chinese firm Midea’s 2016 acquisition of the robotics firm Kuka sparked 
strong objections from politicians and EU representatives. In response to concerns, 
Germany introduced changes in its Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance in 2017, and as 
a result, the German government can now block certain acquisitions more easily based on 
security reasons.15 As of September 2018, the government was reportedly considering 
lowering the threshold of participation by a non-E.U. buyer for deals that can be subject to 
government veto, which would subject more transactions to security reviews.16 
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 In France, the government introduced legislation in June 2018 to tighten screening 
mechanisms, specifically by extending the scope of sectors under consideration to better 
cover strategic industries.  This legislation was still under review as of early September 
2018.17  
 Following a 2017 Green Paper on National Security and Infrastructure Investment Review, 
the government of the United Kingdom introduced legislation to Parliament in 2018 that 
would strengthen the state’s ability to scrutinize foreign investment in innovative 
technology sectors on national security grounds.18   
 After France, Germany and Italy called for a debate on control and scrutiny of foreign 
takeovers in sensitive industries, the European Commission put forward a proposal in 
September 2017 for a regulation establishing a framework for screening FDI inflows into 
the EU on the grounds of security or public order. This proposal was still under discussion 
as of late 2018.  
 In August 2018, the United States enacted the Foreign Investment Risk Review 
Modernization Act (FIRRMA), a legislation that expands the jurisdiction of the Committee 
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) to address growing national security 
concerns over investment traditionally falling outside of CFIUS jurisdiction. Considered 
the most significant overhaul of the Committee since 1988, FIRRMA enlarges the scope of 
transactions reviewable by CFIUS, lengthens its review period, and mandates a separate 
process to review the export of sensitive U.S. technologies.19 CFIUS has the mandate to 
scrutinize companies and determine those which should not be sold as they are strategic 
assets for the country due to positive technological spillovers and creation of jobs. 
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Since January 2017, illustrating the changes currently under way, a number of foreign 
acquisitions by Chinese firms have been blocked or abandoned. In 2017, 11 M&A deals worth 
$100 million or more were withdrawn for regulatory or political reasons, three of which were 
for explicitly stated national security concerns. Two of those related to the acquisition by 
Chinese buyers of U.S. companies in semi-conductors and digital mapping and software 
services (Lattice Semiconductor Corporation and Here International B.V., an IT-related 
company). During the first half of 2018, the trend accelerated with four mega acquisitions 
failing in the U.S. for clearly-stated national security reasons.20 Three of these acquisitions 
directly involved Chinese buyers: the takeover of MoneyGram International (financial 
services), Cogint Inc. (data services), and Xcerra Corporation (semi-conductor testing 
equipment). In addition, three deals were prohibited between December 2016 and March 2018 
by U.S. presidential order—a practice little used in the past21—following recommendations by 
CFIUS (the deals were takeovers of Aixtron,22 Lattice and Qualcomm). Outside the U.S., the 
Australian government rejected high-profile transactions in 2016, such as the sale of a majority 
stake in Ausgrid, an electricity provider, to State Grid Corporation of China on national security 
grounds, too.23 
6. Conclusion 
The dollar value of total Chinese outbound M&A transactions has increased significantly over 
the last decade, and especially since the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007-08. This increase 
has been driven by vibrant M&A activity of large Chinese companies. This surge in M&A 
activity has been fueled by technology and knowledge-driven acquisitions in developed 
markets, as well as natural resource driven acquisitions in Latin America at first and now more 
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and more in electricity sector and other parts of the world. Other factors driving Chinese 
investments abroad have been a desire for market diversification and adding international 
valued brand names (as it was the case of Lenovo’s acquisition of IBM’s personal computer’s 
division in 2005) to their portfolio. Outbound M&A also helps Chinese firms establish new 
marketing and distribution channels. Lastly, cheap currency valuations in many developed 
markets, especially in Europe after the crisis in 2011, also made the valuations of foreign targets 
cheaper, boosting the Chinese outbound M&A activity from less than $40 billion in 2007 to 
over $140 billion in 2016 (year to date). The surge was such that, in fact, by June 2016, the 
value of announced M&As already exceeded the value achieved for the full 2015 year ($138 
billion). The above analyses point to the following: 
 The global financial crisis, has been an inflexion point for Chinese M&As which gained 
importance as a mode of entry for Chinese multinationals. 
 Overall, both Chinese greenfield OFDI and outbound M&As have gained prominence. The 
U.S. and other major developed countries are not keeping up with the dynamic pace of 
growth in outbound M&A deals that we observe in Asia and in Africa. 
 China’s greenfield investments remains predominantly of a South-South nature. Though the 
share of developed countries has especially increased post-crisis, about 70% of China’s 
OFDI are still directed towards developing and emerging economies in Asia, Africa and 
Latin America. This is in contrast to Chinese M&As, which from the beginning were largely 
directed towards Europe and North America (about 60% of the value of the M&A deals) 
and have remained so over the years. The volume of M&A deals by Chinese firms targeting 
these regions has increased remarkably in value terms since the global financial crisis. In 
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the process, Europe has taken the lead as the primary target of M&As by emerging market 
multinationals, followed by North America.  
 In both greenfield FDI projects and M&As, available data suggest the growing 
attractiveness of service based and consumer related industries for Chinese companies, 
while heavy or more traditional industries such as Energy (Oil, Coal and Gas) or Materials 
(such as Metals) either stagnated or declined in importance. This suggests a broader trend 
in the overseas expansion that will increasingly prioritize consumer markets around the 
world. It illustrates a shift in Chinese multinationals’ investment strategies. The emergence 
of Alternative and Renewable Industry as a significant part of the China’s OFDI project 
portfolio is also worth noting. All combined, these trends point to the new ambitions of 
Chinese multinationals, both in terms of markets and industries, and to the capabilities these 
firms have been building—and will most likely continue to build—over the years. 
As we close this analysis of China’s outbound M&A activity, we can see that Chinese 
companies have come a long way since the early 2000s, becoming major global acquirers. To 
reach this status, they have been willing to pay a relatively higher price in recent years 
(especially in the post global financial crisis period) for overseas acquisitions. Following their 
2015-2016 buying spree, however, a significant slowdown in Chinese M&As has taken place 
in 2017. This reflects the double blow which they have been facing: at home, the Chinese 
government has shifted towards increased scrutiny while abroad, especially in developed 
countries host governments have been making efforts to strengthen the control and supervision 
of foreign acquisitions, often citing national security concerns.  
Yet, the long-term overall trend in Chinese M&As – and broadly speaking outward direct 
investment- remains to be seen. All of the factors that led to the fast expansion of Chinese 
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overseas activities still remain in play. On the one hand, Chinese firms continue to look for new 
and innovative ways to expand into global markets. On the other, and despite increasing 
scrutiny, the Chinese government still encourages outbound investment in line with its overall 
strategy for the transformation of the Chinese economy. Combined, these factors are powerful 
drivers for continued Chinese M&A, at a possibly lower but more sustainable level. 
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Emerging Markets Institute. Cornell S.C. Johnson College of Business. Cornell University. 
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Buyers HQ - Country [Target] HQ - Country [Buyers]
11/23/2015 Allergan plc (NYSE:AGN) 190,971 Pfizer Inc. (NYSE:PFE) Ireland United States
09/17/2015 SABMiller plc (LSE:SAB) 113,215 Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV 
(ENXTBR:ABI)
United Kingdom Belgium
05/18/2016 Monsanto Company (NYSE:MON) 66,321 Bayer AG (DB:BAYN) United States Germany
02/03/2016 Syngenta AG (SWX:SYNN) 43,000 China National Chemical Corporation Switzerland China
07/27/2015 Allergan plc, Global Generic 
Pharmaceuticals Business
40,279 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited 
(NYSE:TEVA)
United States Israel
11/17/2015 Norfolk Southern Corporation (NYSE:NSC) 37,039 Canadian Pacific Railway Limited 
(TSX:CP)
United States Canada
01/11/2016 Baxalta Incorporated 36,220 Shire plc (LSE:SHP) United States Ireland
07/01/2015 The Chubb Corporation 31,551 Chubb Limited (NYSE:CB) United States Switzerland
08/04/2015 Baxalta Incorporated 30,908 Shire plc (LSE:SHP) United States Ireland
01/25/2016 Tyco International plc 16,758 Johnson Controls International plc 
(NYSE:JCI)
Ireland United States
02/23/2016 London Stock Exchange Group plc (LSE:LSE) 15,783 Deutsche Boerse AG (XTRA:DB1) United Kingdom Germany
12/07/2015 Keurig Green Mountain, Inc. 14,253 Acorn Holdings B.V. United States Netherlands
09/08/2015 Power Assets Holdings Limited (SEHK:6) 13,596 Assets Global International Limited Hong Kong British Virgin Islands
11/17/2015 Airgas, Inc. 13,459 Air Liquide SA (ENXTPA:AI) United States France
09/08/2015 Oil Search Limited (ASX:OSH) 12,529 Woodside Petroleum Ltd. (ASX:WPL) Papua New Guinea Australia
12/15/2015 Sanofi, Animal Health Business 12,457 Boehringer Ingelheim International 
Gmbh
France Germany
02/09/2016 ITC Holdings Corp. (NYSE:ITC) 11,478 Fortis Inc. (TSX:FTS) United States Canada
08/25/2015 RSA Insurance Group plc (LSE:RSA) 10,934 Zurich Insurance Group AG (SWX:ZURN) United Kingdom Switzerland
09/04/2015 TECO Energy, Inc. 10,422 Emera Incorporated (TSX:EMA) United States Canada
07/02/2015 K+S Aktiengesellschaft (DB:SDF) 10,401 Potash Corporation of Saskatchewan 
Inc. (TSX:POT)
Germany Canada
03/21/2016 IHS Inc. 10,339 IHS Markit Ltd. (NasdaqGS:INFO) United States United Kingdom
02/10/2016 Meda AB 10,071 Mylan N.V. (NasdaqGS:MYL) Sweden United Kingdom
04/28/2016 Medivation, Inc. (NasdaqGS:MDVN) 9,543 Sanofi (ENXTPA:SAN) United States France
03/30/2016 SGS Tool Company 9,046 Kyocera Corp. (TSE:6971) United States Japan
12/18/2015 Nanyang Commercial Bank Limited 8,771 China Cinda Asset Management Co., 
Ltd. (SEHK:1359)
Hong Kong China
06/21/2016 Supercell Oy 8,600 Tencent Holdings Limited (SEHK:700) Finland China
03/16/2016 Strategic Hotels & Resorts, Inc. 8,275 Anbang Insurance Group Co., Ltd. United States China
08/06/2015 OCI N.V., European, North American And 
Global Distribution Businesses
8,000 CF Industries Holdings, Inc. (NYSE:CF) Netherlands United States
09/02/2015 Polyus Gold International Limited 7,693 Wandle Holdings Limited United Kingdom Cyprus
09/03/2015 Avolon Holdings Limited 7,656 HNA Group Co., Ltd. Ireland China
02/17/2016 Ingram Micro Inc. (NYSE:IM) 7,254 Tianjin Tianhai Investment Co., Ltd. 
(SHSE:900938)
United States China
07/28/2015 Elster Group SE 6,524 Honeywell International Inc. 
(NYSE:HON)
Germany United States
07/28/2015 Italcementi SpA (BIT:IT) 6,473 HeidelbergCement AG (DB:HEI) Italy Germany
07/29/2015 Cytec Industries Inc. 6,350 Solvay SA (ENXTBR:SOLB) United States Belgium
05/19/2016 FMC Technologies, Inc. (NYSE:FTI) 6,301 Technip SA (ENXTPA:TEC) United States France
11/02/2015 Dyax Corp. 5,886 Shire Pharmaceuticals International United States Ireland
11/03/2015 King Digital Entertainment plc 5,831 Activision Blizzard, Inc. (NasdaqGS:ATVI) Ireland United States
09/08/2015 MS Amlin plc 5,643 Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. United Kingdom Japan
12/07/2015 Neptune Orient Lines Limited 5,560 CMA CGM S.A. Singapore France
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Buyers HQ - Country [Target] HQ - Country [Buyers]
01/15/2016 GE Appliances Inc. 5,400 Qingdao Haier Co., Ltd. (SHSE:600690) United States China
11/27/2015 China TieTong Telecommunications 
Corporation
5,357 China Mobile Limited (SEHK:941) China Hong Kong
01/26/2016 Terex Corporation (NYSE:TEX) 5,230 Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science and 
Technology Co., Ltd. (SZSE:000157)
United States China
03/14/2016 Tuxiana Corp. And CITIC Real Estate Co., 
Ltd.
5,146 China Overseas Land & Investment Ltd. 
(SEHK:688)
China Hong Kong
09/29/2015 Reynolds America Subsidiaries And 
Trademarks For Natural American Spirit 
Outside U.S.
5,007 JT International Company Netherlands 
B.V.
Japan Netherlands
12/03/2015 Komi Oil Ltd 5,000 Gaetano LLC Russia United States
08/11/2015 Terex Corporation (NYSE:TEX) 4,633 Konecranes Plc (HLSE:KCR1V) United States Finland
09/20/2015 Atmel Corporation 4,446 Dialog Semiconductor Plc (XTRA:DLG) United States United Kingdom
08/11/2015 Symetra Financial Corporation 4,414 Sumitomo Life Insurance Company United States Japan
05/18/2016 KUKA Aktiengesellschaft (DB:KU2) 4,386 Mecca International (BVI) Limited Germany British Virgin Islands
07/29/2015 Industrial Income Trust Inc. 4,279 Global Logistic Properties Limited, 
Investment Arm
United States Singapore
06/29/2016 PrivateBancorp, Inc. (NasdaqGS:PVTB) 4,131 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
(TSX:CM)
United States Canada
11/23/2015 Edra Global Energy Bhd 4,011 China General Nuclear Power 
Corporation
Malaysia China
12/17/2015 Acerta Pharma B.V. 4,000 AstraZeneca PLC (LSE:AZN) Netherlands United Kingdom
12/22/2015 99.81% stake in Finansbank, 0.2% stake in 
Yatirim and Portföy and 29.87% stake in 
Finans Finansal
3,935 Qatar National Bank S.A.Q. (DSM:QNBK) Turkey Qatar
05/06/2016 Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., 
Performance Materials Division
3,800 Evonik Industries AG (DB:EVK) United States Germany
09/08/2015 Amdipharm Mercury Company Limited 3,531 Concordia International Corp. (TSX:CXR) United Kingdom Canada
08/26/2015 Betfair Group PLC 3,502 Paddy Power Betfair plc (ISE:PPB) United Kingdom Ireland
01/11/2016 Legend Pictures, LLC 3,500 Dalian Wanda Group Co Ltd United States China
04/25/2016 Ball Corporation, Select Metal Beverage Can 
Assets, Support and Functions in Europe, 
Brazil and US
3,420 Ardagh Group S.A. United States Luxembourg
06/21/2016 Dematic Group S.à r.l. 3,250 KION GROUP AG (XTRA:KGX) Luxembourg Germany
03/11/2016 Portfolio of 19 Hotels Assets in China 3,234 Amare Investment Management China Singapore
10/22/2015 MEGlobal B.V. 3,200 EQUATE Petrochemical Company 
(K.S.C.C.)
United Arab Emirates Kuwait
08/03/2015 HERE Holding Corporation 3,124 Daimler AG (XTRA:DAI); Bayerische 
Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft 
(DB:BMW); AUDI AG (DB:NSU)
United States AUDI AG (DB:NSU) (Germany); 
Bayerische Motoren Werke 
Aktiengesellschaft (DB:BMW) 
(Germany); Daimler AG (XTRA:DAI) 
(Germany)
02/22/2016 Brake Bros Limited 3,100 Sysco Corporation (NYSE:SYY) United Kingdom United States
06/16/2016 Hermes Microvision, Inc. (GTSM:3658) 3,091 ASML Holding NV (ENXTAM:ASML) Taiwan Netherlands
03/28/2016 100% of Dell Systems Corporation And Dell 
Technology & Solutions Limited And Dell 
Services Pte. Ltd.
3,055 NTT DATA, Inc. Singapore United States
04/19/2016 SABMiller plc, European Business 2,901 Asahi Group Holdings, Ltd. (TSE:2502) United Kingdom Japan
12/09/2015 FRHI Holdings Limited 2,897 Accor S.A. (ENXTPA:AC) Canada France
11/13/2015 Skyway Concession Company, LLC 2,836 OMERS Administration Corp.; Canada 
Pension Plan Investment Board; Ontario 
Teachers' Pension Plan
United States Canada Pension Plan Investment 
Board (Canada); OMERS 
Administration Corp. (Canada); 
Ontario Teachers' Pension Plan 
(Canada)
07/30/2015 Swissport International Ltd. 2,818 HNA Group Co., Ltd. Switzerland China
06/30/2016 InterOil Corporation (NYSE:IOC) 2,817 Exxon Mobil Corporation (NYSE:XOM) Singapore United States
11/02/2015 MedAssets, Inc. 2,775 Pamplona Capital Management LLP, 
Private Equity
United States United Kingdom
05/09/2016 TF Holdings Ltd. 2,770 CMOC Limited Africa Hong Kong
06/14/2016 NXP Semiconductors NV, Standard Products 
Business
2,750 Beijing JianGuang Asset Management 
Co., Ltd.; Wise Road Capital Ltd.
Netherlands Beijing JianGuang Asset 
Management Co., Ltd. (China); Wise 
Road Capital Ltd. (China)
12/08/2015 Fairchild Semiconductor International Inc. 
(NasdaqGS:FCS)
2,694 China Resources Microelectronics 
Limited; Hua Capital Management Ltd.
United States China Resources Microelectronics 
Limited (China); Hua Capital 
Management Ltd. (China)
07/16/2015 GETRAG Getriebe- und Zahnradfabrik 
Hermann Hagenmeyer GmbH & Cie KG
2,670 Magna International Inc. (TSX:MG) Germany Canada
01/19/2016 Rouse Properties, Inc. 2,576 Brookfield Asset Management Inc. 
(TSX:BAM.A)
United States Canada
04/06/2016 Glencore Plc, Agricultural Products Business 2,500 Canada Pension Plan Investment Board United Kingdom Canada
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Source: Based on Standard &Poors’ Capital IQ data accessed by September based of announced outbound M&A 
transactions July 1, 2015- June 30, 2016. 
Authors have excluded manually domestic transactions and those global ones where a consortium of 
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Buyers HQ - Country [Target] HQ - Country [Buyers]
06/05/2016 Asia Square Tower 1 2,499 Qatar Investment Authority Singapore Qatar
05/20/2016 InterOil Corporation (NYSE:IOC) 2,488 Oil Search Limited (ASX:OSH) Singapore Papua New Guinea
06/02/2016 ALS Limited (ASX:ALQ) 2,478 Advent International Corporation; Bain 
Capital, LP
Australia Advent International Corporation 
(United States); Bain Capital, LP 
(United States)
07/13/2015 Alent plc 2,351 Platform Specialty Products Corporation 
(NYSE:PAH)
United Kingdom United States
12/03/2015 9.01% Stake In Grupo Financiero Inbursa, 
S.A.B. de C.V. And 17.3% Stake In The Bank 
of East Asia
2,322 Criteria Caixa, S.A., Single-Shareholder 
Corporation
Mexico Spain
11/25/2015 PetroChina Kunlun Gas Co., Ltd. 2,321 Kunlun Energy Company Limited 
(SEHK:135)
China Hong Kong
10/01/2015 Representaciones e Investigaciones 
Medicas, S.A. de C.V.
2,300 Teva Pharmaceutical Industries Limited 
(NYSE:TEVA)
Mexico Israel
07/15/2015 Shred-it International Inc. 2,300 Stericycle, Inc. (NasdaqGS:SRCL) Canada United States
07/27/2015 Sirius International Insurance Group Ltd. 2,235 CM International Holding Pte. Ltd. Bermuda Singapore
12/31/2015 Priory Group Limited 2,224 Acadia Healthcare Company, Inc. 
(NasdaqGS:ACHC)
United Kingdom United States
04/15/2016 Polycom, Inc. (NasdaqGS:PLCM) 2,160 Mitel Networks Corporation 
(NasdaqGS:MITL)
United States Canada
12/16/2015 Pacific Hydro Pty Ltd. 2,160 State Power Investment Corporation Australia China
09/23/2015 Landmark Aviation, L.L.C. 2,065 BBA Aviation plc (LSE:BBA) United States United Kingdom
10/21/2015 Viom Networks Limited 2,064 ATC Asia Pacific Pte. Ltd. India Singapore
10/17/2015 Wincor Nixdorf Aktiengesellschaft 
(XTRA:WIN)
2,053 Diebold, Incorporated (NYSE:DBD) Germany United States
05/10/2016 RHP Western Portfolio Group And American 
Home Portfolio Group And AMC Portfolio 
And MHC Portfolio IV
2,035 Brookfield Property Group LLC United States Canada
04/11/2016 gategroup Holding AG (SWX:GATE) 2,016 HNA Group Co., Ltd. Switzerland China
05/23/2016 WMF Group GmbH 1,916 SEB SA (ENXTPA:SK) Germany France
02/19/2016 Home Retail Group plc 1,916 Steinhoff International Holdings N.V. 
(JSE:SNH)
United Kingdom South Africa
11/09/2015 Fidelity & Guaranty Life (NYSE:FGL) 1,897 Anbang Insurance Group Co., Ltd. United States China
09/18/2015 Veda Group Limited 1,873 Equifax Inc. (NYSE:EFX) Australia United States
03/31/2016 SMCP S.A.S. 1,861 Shandong Ruyi Technology Group Co. 
Ltd.
France China
